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This paper formulates a model of the youth labor market. At the heart
of the model is a minimum wage restriction which causes some youths to
become unemployed and prevents others from training. Labor is assumed to
be heterogeneous in performance on skilled iobs and is less productiveas
youths thanas adults simply because of immaturity. The model is applied
to analyze the effects of three representative policies: a youth subminimuin
wage, subsidies paid to firms that hire youths, and training subsidies that











This paper formulates a model of the youth labor market and applies
that model to analyze the effects of policies which are aimed at improving
the labor market status of youths., and in particular their employment rate
and the quality of jobs that they hold.1 At the heart of the model isa
minimum wage restriction which has the effect both of causing some youths
to become unemployed and of preventing other youths from entering jobs in
which they could acquire training which would be useful in their adult
years.2 There are! in turn, repercus ons in the adultlabor market, since
the mix of youth employment among skilled and unskilled Jobs affects the
demand for adult skilled and unskilled workers through the usual factor
substitutability channels. In order to evaluate fully any policy aimed at
conditions in the youth labor market, it is necessary to trace through the
effects that the policy will eventually have on the steady state conditions
in both the youth and the adult labor markets. Thispaper considers three
representative policies: a youth subminimurn wage, subsidies paid to firms
that hire youths, and training subsidies that offset the costs of on—the—
job training. The purpose is to improve our understanding of how
employment and training are determined and how they are influenced by
policy.
The model developed here incorporates a number of features which are
important for any analysis of the youth labor market, yet which have not
previously been combined in a single model. First, labor is assumed to be
heterogeneous in that different workers are not equally productive in a
given skilled job.4 Second, in contrast to some wage models where "good
Jobs' offer the minimum wage and "bad jobs" offer less than the minimum, in
this model "good jobs" provide training opportunities and frequently paymore than the minimum wage to youths, while 'bad jobs pay only the minimum
and provide few training opportunities. Finally, individuals are presumed
to be less productive as youths than they will ultimately be as adults
simply because of their age (immaturity).5A model incorporating these
features can be used to analyze how particular employment and training
outcomes are affected by labor market policies.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II develops a
model in which the on—the—job training can be either specific or general,
and which includes the features described above. Section III examines the
models properties and derives the effects o+ alternative policies.
Section IV considers some of the welfare implications of the results in
terms of ascertaining which groups are better off and which groups are
worse off as a result of alternative policy changes.A final section
briefly addresses some remaining issues pertaining to the model.
II.A Model of the Youth Labor Market
This section develops a model of youth labor market experience. The
model incorporates two broad economic sectors, which may be called the
primary" and "secondary' sectors, and it considers workers at two stages
in their working lives, namely youth and adulthood (for a related analysis,
see Dickens and Lang, 1983). The two sectors contain what we have called
'good jobs1and"bad jobs," respectively. The secondary sector is a sector
where skill and training do not have a very great effect on productivity.
It may be convenient to visualize this sector as being comprised of fast—
food outlets, grocery stores, car washes, and similar establishments.In
the primary sector, on the other hand, an individual's productivity does
depend on his ability and training. Training must be acquired on the job
by going through an initial period of lower productivity, while ability isconsidered to be an inherent characteristic of the individual. This
implies that some people will be more productive than others in this
sector, even if they have the same amount of training,
Youths may work in either sector, but their productivity will be lower
than the productivity of comparable adult workers. The lower productivity
exposes them to the possibility that ctallof them have sufficient
productivity to earn the minimum wage, with the result that there may be
substantial unemployment among youth. Following Feldstein (1973), in the
primary sector this problem of insufficient productivity to Justify the
minimum wage is aggravated by the fact that any training required for work
in this sector reduces productivity even further, and that this training,
to the extent it is general training, must be fully financed by the
individual at the time of the training. The lower productivityamong
youths, combined with training requirements for the primary sector, leads
to a sorting equilibrium in which individuals follow one of three paths
during their working lives, depending on their individual—specific level of
innate ability. The most able individuals will find employment in the
primary sector even as youths because the productivity resulting from their
natural ability justifies a wage above the minimum, despite their relative
immaturity and the fact that they must be trained.4 second group with
intermediate natural ability levels will not be able to find employment in
the primary sector as youths, but will be able to find such work as adults.
During their youth, these workers as a group will have spotty employment
records in the secondary sector, since they have no real advantage over
anyone else seeking work in that sector. The third group, with the lowest
levels of natural ability, will also find spotty work in the secondary
sector as youths, and as adult workers they will find steadier employmentin thissector as they become more mature and their productivity increases.
To begin a more formal description of the model, let T1 be the number
of years that each individual spends as a youth at the beginning of his
labor force participation and T2 be the number of years he spends as an
adult in his prime—age working years. The age distribution of individuals
in the labor force is presumed to be uniform, so that the number of youths
and adults in the labor force can be written as pT1 and pT2,
respectively, for some constant of proportionality p. Labor is assumed
to be supplied inelastically, which means that the school—work decisions of
youths are not examined in this model.6
The technology of the model is described in Table 1.The technology
represented in this table is assumed to be linear, meaning constant returns
to labor of a given productivity. The underlying physical productivity of
adult labor in the two sectors is denoted as Y+ and Y
respectively, where and are exogenous to the analy:is.7 is a
time—invariant individual effect associated with each individual's
abilities, and it affects productivity in the primary but not the secondary
sector (this is to say that all individuals can make hamburgers equally
well but that some individuals are better than others at doing electrical
work, even after training) The productivity of youth labor is given by
the fractions and of the adult productivity, with the fractions
reflecting what may be called the immaturity factor.In general,
would be expected to be less than reflecting the fact that in the
primary sector mistakes can be costlier than in the secondary sector.
Finally, anyone working in the primary sector must undergo training for
years, during which period productivity is reduced by C. The assumption
of fixed training costs enables the model to focus more sharply on the
effects of potential policy changes on the employment and welfare of youths
4and adults in the two sectors; for a model focusing more on the
determination of the amount of training, see Hashimoto (1982).
The output of the primary sector is taken as the numeraire, and the
relative price of the output of the secondary sector is given by P. The
value of the minimum wage is measured in terms of the numeriare, thatis,
the minimum wage is taken as given in terms of primary sector output. The
model presumes that workers in each sector are paid the value of their
productivity. For youths in the secondary sector, who are assumed to be
constrained by the minimum wage, the following relationship must hold:
(1) +3 = W ss w m
where W is the minimum wage.S (which is also measured in terms of m w
primary sector output)is the value of any wage subsidy that the
government pays to firms which employ youths; in the case of any subsidies
provided by the government in the model, the government is presumed to be
able to raise sufficient revenues by means of lump sum taxation, This
equation says that the value of the youth's production in the secondary
sector plus the amount of the wage subsidy must be equal to the minimum
wage.
For youths in the primary sector, it is necessary first to identify
the productivity of the marginal youth in this sector. Suppose that the
fraction n1 of youths work in the primary sector. Let F(s) be the
cumulative distribution function of the random variable ,anddenote its
inverse by 6(n). Then since the topn1 of the distribution of
will be employed in the primary sector, the value of associatedwith
the last youth hired in this sector will be 6(1 —
n21).
The total
discounted productivity of this youth (including any subsidies)
,shouldhe
5remain with the firm over his lifetime, is given by the quantity
'[ + 5(1—n)] +d[Y +5(1—a)] —(C—S) +S pp p1 1 p p1 2 t 1 wi
1 .1 —p1
where , dt, 2 = dt,d =e 1, pis the discount
rate, and St is the value of any subsidy provided by the government for
training in the primary sector, again measured in terms of primary sector
output. The four terms in this expression are the productivity of the
individual as a youth, the productivity as an adult, the training costs net
of any subsidies, and the wage subsidy.
Marginal youths jn this sector will need as much of this lifetime
productivity as possible to be paid in the early years in order to satisfy
the minimum wage requirements. Firms will be willing to do so, even if it
means paying youths more than their marginal productivity, as long as the
firms can be reasonably assured that the youth will remain with the firm as
an adult, and as long as the total lifetime payments to the individual do
not exceed the individual 's lifetime productivity as calculated above.In
particular, the wages the firm pays the individual during his adult
years must at least match what the individual could get at another firm.
If the individual were to go to another firm at the beginning of his adult
years, he would have to undergo some fraction, say u, of his training
again. This fraction of the training may be regarded as specific, with the
remainder being regarded as general. Thus, the value of his productivity
at the second firm, discounted back to the beginning of his working life,
is given by'°
d{CY +5(1—n)]K— c*(C—S) }
p p1 2 t 1
If the first firm is to pay at least this much to the individual as an
adult, and if the individuals total discounted lifetime productivity is
6given by the previous expression, then the maximum that the firm will be
willing to pay the individual as a youth is given by the difference between
the two expressions:
'['7+6(1—n)3 —(1—d)(C—S)K+ SK
p p p1 1 t 1wi
The per period wage rate which the firm can pay to a youth is then found by
dividing the above expression by K1andit is this amount which must be
Just equal to the minimum wage for the marginal individual hired into the
primary sector as a youth:
(2) v CY+6(1—n)] —(1—d)(C—S) +G = W pp p1 t w m
It can be seen in this expression that the firm is not willing to finance
general training, but it will finance up to the fraction d of the costs
of specific training, net of whatever subsidy is available to offset the
training costs.11 The fraction of specific training costs that the firm
will be willing to bear will evidently be higher the lower the real
discount rate.'2
Specific training thus allows firms to offer an implicit contract
which permits some individuals to be hired as youths in the primary sector
even though their productivity net of training costs plus wage subsidies
falls below the minimum wage. Moreover, this implicit contract arises even
in the absence of cyclical fluctuations in demand, which provide the usual
explanation for the firm bearing the cost of specific training. Note that
the fact that the firm is willing to advance some of the costs of specific
but not general training to some individuals in their youth is of
importance in this model only because of the existence of the minimum wage,
and it is of greatest importance to those whose ability in the primary
7sector is marginal and whose wage net of training costs would otherwise
fall below the minimum. As would be expected, any turnover for reasons
that have not been incorporated in the model, such as differential tastes
for job characteristics or specialized talents that require trial and error
Job search and present a positive probability of quit, will reduce the
willingness of the firm to finance such training and will lead to solutions
that are closer to those obtained when training is general (Mincer, 1981).
Note also that if inframarginal individuals receive the value of the
higher productivity attributed to their greater ability levels, most youths
who are employed in the primary sector will be receiving a wage above the
legal minimum. Thus if one were to observe only those youth who hold
minimum wage Jobs, only a small proportion would be found receiving
1,
training. This does not mean, however, that a training or wage subsidy
or youth subminimum wage program would have no effect on the number of
youths receiving on—the—job training. The effect of such programs would
depend on the increase in the hiring of youths For work in the primary
sector, a marginal effect the size of which should not be judged to be
equal to the fraction of minimum wage workers who receive training.14
Among adult workers, the necessary requirement is that the marginal
worker hired in the primary sector as an adult must be indifferent between
working in the primary and secondary sectors.'5 To specify this
requirement, let n2 be the fraction of adults whD are working in the
primary sector. The indifference relationship for this marginal adult
hired in the primary sector can be stated as:'6
(3) K = U +3(1—n)]K— (C—S)K
2 s p p22 t 1
In this relationship, the left side represents the discounted value of the
productivity of this marginal individual in the secondary sector during his
Sadult working years. The right side represents the discounted value of his
productivity in the primary sector, with the second term representing the
training costs, net of any training subsidies,'7 The term 6(1 —n2)is
the value of s associated with this individual.
In this model, all adult workers will be employed in any solution
which is characterized by youths working in the secondary sector. This is
because a youth working in the secondary sector is producing enough output
to earn the minimum wage, and all adult workers can produce at least this
much output in that sector. Hence, if there are youths employed in the
secondary sector, then it is possible for all adults to earn at least the
minimum wage, and all of them should be employed. The appropriate relation
to express this requirement is:
(4) n2 +n,, 1
where n2 is the fraction of adults working in the secondary sector.
Since a solution with no youths working in the secondary sector is not very
interesting, we will confine our attention in this paper to the case where
they do and where therefore equation (4) holds.
The amounts produced of the two types of output, expressed as
functions of the labor inputs are found by multiplying the productivities
of youths and adults in the two sectors by the numbers of youths and adults
in the sectors, and adding the results. For the primary sector, this











dF(€) is the average value of in the top
6( 1—x)
lOOx percent of the distribution.The first term represents the
9production of youths and the second term the production ofadults,both
gross of training costs, and the final term subtracts out current training
costs. With regard to the last term, note that the fraction n2 of
individuals spend the fraction T1/(T1+T2)] of their working
years in training, so that in a steady state the number of individuals in
training at any particular time is simply the product of these three




Here,the first term is the production attributable to youths and the
second term the production attributable to adults.
In order to find out how much of the two goods are actually produced,
it is necessary to establish the demand for the two goods as a function of
their prices. The model uses a relatively simple demand function which
specifies the relative demand for the two goods as being dependent on their
relative price:
(7) h(P)
with the first derivative of h being positive. This demand function
specifies that as the relative price of the output of the secondary sector
becomes less expensive, relatively more of it will be demanded. For any
given level of income and the price ratio, this function specifies the
ratio that is demanded, but not the absolute amounts of the two goods.
Since the model is a closed system, the aggregate budget constraint
guarantees that there will be just enough income generated in the
production of the two goods to buy the output, if the price ratio is
correct.
10The seven equations numbered above constitute a complete model in
seven endogenous quantities: the relative price of output of the secondary
sector (P) ,thetwo output levels (q and q5),andthe four ratios




,and n ).Theessence of the model can be
p1 p2 sI s2
described briefly as follows. All adults in the model are presumed to be
employed. Adults with high productivity in the primary sector are employed
in that sector, with most earning wages substantially in excess of the
minimum, while adults whose productivity would be low in the primary sector
areinsteademployed in the secondary sector at a wage only modestly in
excess of the minimum. Youths are employed in the primary sector only if
their potential productivity in that sector, net of whatever training costs
the firms are unwilling to finance, is above the minimum wage. The
remaining youths would all like to work in the secondary sector, but were
they to do so, their production would depress the price of output in that
sector so much that they would be unable to earn the minimum wage there.
Therefore, only enough of them can find jobs in that sector so that the
price of secondary sector output remains high enough to justify paying the
minimum wage to youths who are employed in that sector. The remainder of
the youths are unemployed.
III. Policy Analysis with the Model.
Thissection willbe concerned with analyzing how employment in the
two sectors, particularly youth employment, behaves under alternative
policy changes. The model contains three parameters which are of interest
for potential policies to mitigate the effects of the minimum wage on the
youth labor market. The first such parameter is 9w' the potential wage
subsidy to firms that hire youths, and the second is S, the training
11subsidy for firms in the primary sector to defray the training expenses of
newly hired workers.18 The third parameter is We, the minimum wage
variable. Since in this model the minimum wage is not binding on adults., a
reduction in Wmay be interpreted either as the introduction of a youth
sub—minimum or as a reduction of the minimum for all workers. Further,
given the way S( and Wm enter into equations (1) and (2), which are the
only equations in which they appear, either an increase in the wage subsidy
or an equal reduction in the minimum wage would have the same employment
effects, since either would permit fires to hire youths. whose productivity
has less value. Hence, in this section we will not consider changes in
We, with the understanding that the employment and output changes arising
from changes in Scan be interpreted as being the result of changes
either in the youth wage subsidy or in the minimum wage.
The first three equations of the model determine youth and adult
employment in the primary sector and the relative price of secondary sector
output. The impact of either a training or a wage subsidy on these
quantities can be calculated as follows:
dn IdS =1/(wG) >0 dn /dS (1—du)/(w 8') >0
p1 w p1 p1 t p1
dn2/dS
=1/(vG)
>0 dn2/dS K1/(K2G)> 0
dP/dS =— 1/(t ) >0 dP/dS =0
p4 55 t
Both types of subsidy are seen to increase not only youth employment in the
primary sector, but also adult employment in that sector. With regard to
youth employment, both subsidies permit youths with lower ability levels to
earn wages above the minimum during their period of training. For adults,
the two subsidies encourage employment in the primary sector, but in
12different ways. The training subsidy increases the wages that can be
offered to adults entering that sector, and for some adults whose ability
levels put them at the margin between working in the primary or secondary
sector, the increased wages in the primary sector will shift them there.
The youth wage subsidy, on the other hand, causes the price ofsecondary
output to fall, and by making it less attractive for the marginal
adults to work in the secondary sector, the subsidy encourages a shift of
such individuals to the primary sector. Interestingly, since an increase
in the minimum wage would have the opposite effect of an increase in the
youth wage subsidy, these results indicate that in increase in the minimum
wage would cause adult employment in the primary sector to decline. The
reason is that an increase in the minimum wage would increase the price of
secondary sector output and make it more attractive for the adults on the
margin to work in that sector.
The effects on the other variables in the model can also be readily
inferred from the remaining equations. Since both types of subsidy cause
both youth and adult employment in the primary sector to increase, they
also cause primary sector output to increase. The increase in primary
sector output, in combination with the fact that the relative price of
secondary output is not increased with either type of subsidy, implies
through the relative demand equation (7) that secondary sector output also
increases. Adult employment in this sector falls, reflecting the fact that
there is full employment among adults and that adult employment in the
primary sector has increased. Finally, the combination of increased output
in the secondary sector with the fact that adult employment in the sector
is lower implies that youth employment in that sector must rise as a result
of either type of subsidy.
Although the general employment and output effects are the same for
13the two types of subsidies, the relative sizes of the effects among youths
and adults in the two sectors is not. A convenient way to examine this
issue is to consider a change in either type of subsidy of sufficient
magnitude to increase youth employment in the primary sector by one
individual, and to calculate the magnitude of the accompanying changes in
adult employment in that sector and in youth and adult employment in the
secondary sector. Since the answers will turn in part on whether the
training necessary for the primary sector work is general or specific, let
us first look at the case where training is general, that is, where u =0.
The number of additional adult workers in the primary sector which
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for the youth wage subsidy and the training subsidy. We assume that T1 <
12t which says that the length of time spent as a youth or in training is
shorter than the length of time spent as an adult. This in turn implies
< Then, since i<1 and, in the case of general training, c =0,
the above ratio for the wage subsidy will be larger.That is, for each Job
that a youth wage subsidy or a training subsidy creates for youths in the
primary sector, the wage subsidy will create more jobs for adults in that
sector.
With regard to employment in the secondary sector, the wage subsidy
will cause a greater decline in adult employment, per additional youth
employed in the primary sector, than will the training subsidy. This is
because the wage subsidy would cause a larger increase in adult employment
in the primary sector, and with full employment among adults, there must be
a correspondingly larger reduction in adult employment in the secondary
14sector. With regard to youths in the secondary sector, there are several
considerations in establishing the relative size of the effects of the two
types of subsidy. First, note that per additional youth job in the primary
sector, a wage subsidy will increase adult employment more in that sector,
and hence it will increase the output of the primary sector more. Second,
the relative price of secondary output will fall with a wage subsidy but
not with a training subsidy. Through the demand equation, both the higher
primary sector output and the lower relative price of secondary sector
output will favor an even greater increase in secondary sector output with
the wage subsidy. Finally, this greater increase in secondary sector
output with a wage subsidy is accompanied by a larger decline in adult
employment in this sector, and this tends to make the wage subsidy even
more potent, relative to the training subsidy, in creating youth employment
in the secondary sector. Thus, if training is general, a wage subsidy will
tend to favor employment increases most among youths in the secondary
sector and, to a lesser degree, among adults in the primary sector, while a
training subsidy will be more successful in concentrating employment
increases among youths in the primary sector.
If training in the primary sector is highly specific, so that u 1,
the results may be much different. In this case, the magnitude of the
ratio (dn /dS )/(dn /dB )relative to(dn /dB )/(dn /dS )depends
p2 w p1 w p2 t p1 t
on the value of1/vrelative toc /[ic (1—dc)). Substituting for
5 1 2 1
—pT2 —pT2
and 2' this last expression reduces to 1/(1 —e ).If > 1 — e
then it is possible that for every youth job created in the primary sector,
the youth wage subsidy may create fewer adult jobs in that sector than
would a training subsidy. Further, if the relative demand functionhis
fairly inelastic with respect to the relative price of output in the
15secondary sector, it is in turn possible that for every youth job created
in the primary sector, the wage subsidy will create fewer youth jobs in the
secondary sector than will a training subsidy.In other words, if training
is specific, it is possible that a youth wage subsidy (or, equivalently in
this model, a reduction in the minimum wage) will be more successful at
focusing increases in employment on youths in the primary sector than will
a training subsidy for jobs in the primary sector.
Another way of looking at this result is that if training is specific
rather than general, firms may already be willing to finance a substantial
portion of the casts, net of any subsidy, of training a youth for work in
the primary sector. Under these circumstances, a subsidy to offset the
costs of training does not relax the constraints imposed by the minimum
wage very much, since the firms are willing to finance most of these costs
anyway. Hence, a training subsidy will be relatively less effective in
creating additional youth employment in the primary sector. On the other
hand, if the training is general, firms will be unwilling to finance it,
and it must be financed by the youths themselves.In this case, a training
subsidy will provide mare relief from the constraints imposed by the
minimum wage, and such a subsidy will be relatively more successful in
creating jabs for youths in the primary sector. Thus, the relative merits
of youth wage subsidies (or reductions in the minimum wage) as against
training subsidies for encouraging higher employment of youths in the
primary sector may depend on whether training in that sector is
predominantly general or specific.
IV.WelfareConsiderations
In the previous section, the analysis considered the effects of
changes in the minimum wage and of youth wage subsidies and training
16subsidies on employment of youths and adults in the primary and secondary
sectors.In general, one would expect that a policy which causes an
expansion of employment and/or a shift in employment from the secondary
sector to the primary sector will have positive welfare effects on the
individuals who because of the policy are able to find jobs in the primary
sector or who are no longer unemployed. However, in addition to welfare
effects generated by employment changes, there are welfare effects
associated with any change in relative prices which may occur as a result
of the policies. These additional welfare considerations have two
consequences. First, it is possible in some instances that an individual
who manages to find a Job in the primary sector because of a policy will
nonetheless find himself worse off as a result. Secondly, the large
majority of individuals whose employment status does not change because of
a policy may nevertheless find that their level of welfare is affected by
the policy.
Table 2 summarizes the general welfare implications of changes in the
minimum wage and of youth wage subsidies and training subsidies for various
groups according •to their employment status in the presence of and in the
absence of the particular policy. The first two columns indicate the
sectors in which the individuals in the group would be employed as youths
and as adults without the policy, and the next two columns indicate the
sectors in which they would be employed with the policy. The final three
columns indicate whether the welfare of the group would improve,
deteriorate, stay the same, or would be indeterminate with the policy.
In the table, the groups denoted by A, C, E, H, and 3 include all the
individuals whose employment patterns are not affected by the policies.
For these groups, any welfare change must be mediated either by a change in
relative prices or by a change in wages directly induced by a subsidy.
17Since the training subsidy does not entail any change in the relative price
of secondary sector output, such a subsidy affects the welfare of these
groups only to the extent that it pays for some of the training of primary
workers. Hence, groups 4, C, and H, whose members are trained at one time
or another for employment in the primary sector, gain, while groups E and
J, whose only employment is in the secondary sector, neither gain nor lose
under a training subsidy.4 reduction in the minimum wage, on the other
hand, will lower the relative price of secondary sector output. This will
improve the welfare status of individuals in groups 4 and H, who work only
in the primary sector during their lifetimes. For group C, whose members
work in the secondary sector as youths and in the primary sector as adults,
the welfare effect of a reduction in the minimum wage will be ambiguous.
On balance, though, if their employment in the secondary sector is
relatively short as compared with the length of time they spend in the
primary sector, one would presume that these individuals would probably
show welfare gains. For individualsin groups E and J, whose only
employment is in the secondary sector, the decline in the relative price of
the output of that sector will mean that these groups are worse off with a
reduction in the minimum wage.4 youth wage subsidy creates much the same
pattern of gainers and losers among these five groups as does a reduction
in the minimum wage, except for groups C and E.For the individuals in
group C, the extra value of the subsidy is enough to make them definite
welfare gainers with a wage subsidy. The individuals in group E will also
gain as youths because of the subsidy, but since youth is short relative to
adulthood, one would presume is that on balance they lose because the value
of the secondary output they produce as adults declines. With regard to
either a reduction in the minimum wage or a youth wage subsidy, note in
18particular that individuals in groups E and 3, who are definite or probable
losers under either policy, are at the bottom of the ability scale and also
at the bottom of the wage scale as adults, so that the relative disparity
between high wage groups and low wage groups is likely to be accentuated
under either policy.
The remaining groups include individuals whose employment patterns are
changed by the policies, so that either they would find a job in the
primary sector where otherwise they would not, or they would not be
unemployed whereas otherwise they would. With a training subsidy, all such
groups would be better off, since the gains due to the employment change
would never be offset by a deterioration in the relative price of secondary
sector output. A reduction in the minimum wage or a youth wage subsidy
will also make many of these groups better off, but again in these cases
the deterioration of the relative price of secondary sector output will
cause ambiguities in the welfare effect of the subsidy among groups which
spend part of their time in the secondary sector. For instance, consider
the individuals in group L, who are unemployed as youths at a high minimum
wage but who would be employed with a reduced minimum wage. These
individuals may find that the decline in the value of the wages that they
earn in the secondary sector as adults more than offsets the gains that
they realize as youths by being employed. All of the remaining ambiguous
cases among these groups arise in a similar fashion, with individuals who
are initially employed in the secondary sector as adults suffering losses
because the value of the goods they produce falls.
V.Summary and Conclusions
This paper has explored the effects of changes in the minimum wage, in
the level of youth wage subsidies, and in the level of training subsidies
19n a model characterized by a sorting equilibrium based on the ability
levels of individuals in the labor force. Three results in particular are
worth noting in a summary. First, an increase in the minimum wage may reduce
adult employment in the primary sector, even though such an increase would
reduce youth employment in this sector and even though the model assumes
perfect substitutability between youths and adults within industries (although
not at a one—to—one rate> and full employment of adults. Secondly, whether or
not a youth wage subsidy or a reduction in the minimum wage is more successful
than a training subsidy at creating primary sector jobs for youths depends
on whether or not training in the primary sector is specific or general.
If the training is specific, it is possible that a wage subsidy or a
reduction in the minimum wage can create a relatively larger fraction of
new youth jobs in this sector. This result may occur because firms are
already willing to finance a large fraction of the costs of specific
training, so that a training subsidy does little additional to relieve the
constraint imposed by a minimum wage. Finally, it should be kept in mind
that these subsidies may have large welfare effects on groups other than
the groups immediately affected by the subsidy. Most importantly, it
appears that a youth wage subsidy or a reduction in the minimum wage will
in general have an unfavorable impact on most adult secondary workers and a
positive impact on most adult primary sector workers.
It should be kept in mind that in the interests of making relatively
clear the mechanisms generating the results, the model has been kept fairly
simple. There are a number of directions in which the model could be
extended, many of which are suggested by the existing literature. These
include: (a> the elimination of the sharp dichotomy between youth and
adulthood by introducing additional periods representing the transition
between these two phases in the life cycle, (b) the introduction of a skill
20factor, varying from individual to individual, in the secondary sector, (c)
the introduction of heterogeneity in the productivity losses due to the
immaturity of youths, (d) a role for general labor market experience, which
would require the specification of some mechanism for allocating
unemployment among youth, (e) a corresponding role for specific job
experience and its relation to internal labor markets via job ladders (See
Hall, 1981, and Carmichael, 1983b) ,(4)a consideration of imperfect
information about the individual s productivity, his propensity to quit,
the characteristics or requirements of the job, and/or the course of future
demand, which may vary for cyclical or other reasons, all of which provide
alternative reasons for unemployment and turnover and which hence affect
the firms willingness to finance specific training (See Oi, 1983 and
Carmichael, 1983a) ,(g)a consideration of potential variation in the
quantity of on—the—job training, and (h) the introduction of an elastic
supply of untrained vs. generally trained labor perhaps resulting from the
availability of vocational training in the schools. Although many of these
extensions should be addressed before any empirical implementation of the
model, it does not appear that they should change substantially the
principal conclusions mentioned above.
4-Footnotes
1. For a thorough analysis of the course of employment and wages in the
youth labor market in recent years, see Freeman and Wise (1983) and
Freeman and Medoff (1983).
2. A number of reasons other than the minimum wage have been given for
the unsatisfactory performance of the youth labor market. These
include the following(a) the casual labor market attachment of
full—time students (Feldstein and Eliwoad, 1983), (b) imperfect or
asymmetric information about individual abilities, efforts expended,
preferences, and the characteristics and requirements of jobs (e.g.,
see Leighton and Mincer, 1983), and (c) high relative reservation
wages due to income maintenance programs (Venti, 1993).
3. The policies we examine are general forms of the three major 'policies
to reduce youth unemployment' cited in the 1983 Economic Report of the
President, pp. 44—45. The policies described there are the Job
Training and Partnership Act of 1982, the Minimum Wage Reform, and the
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. There is, however, a major difference
between the policies we examine and those cited in the Economic
Report. The policies examined in this paper are, for the most part,
not narrowly targeted on special groups within the youth or adult
populations.(For a discussion of the implications of narrow targeting,
see Johnson, 1982).
4. For a discussion of the importance of assuming a heterogeneous
population when analyzing labor market policy, see Nichols (1982).
For studies of the impact of minimum wages which assume the population
is heterogeneous in their abilities, see keckman and Sadlacek (1981)
and Meyer and Wise (1983).
5. For a sample of employer testimony to the effect that youths are less
reliable and less productive than older workers for reasons other than
inexperience, see Barton (1976).
6. The relationship between minimum wages and the decision to continue in
school is discussed by Mincer and Leighton (1981). For an empirical
analysis of the impact of wage offers and youth unemployment on the
jointly determined school choice and labor supply decisions, see
Sustman and Steinmeier (1981). The effects of minimum wages on the
employment, compensation, and schooling of youth depend on whether, in
addition to basic schooling, there is general vocational training
available in the schools. For a discussion, see Gustmart and
Steinmeier (1982).
7. Note that this assumes that adult productivity is unaffected by the
uunemployment experience f the individual as a youth. Meyer and Wise
(1982) find that holding individual specific characteristics constant,
there is no lasting effect of nonemployment after leaving school on
employment in subsequent years. They do find, however, that early
nonemployment is associated with lower wage rates later in one's
youth. Ellwood (1983) also finds that there are persistent negative
effects of lost wages. Findings that wages are lower for those
22unemployed as youths all the way into adulthood would have greatest
impact on our results if these findings do not in fact represent the
effects of unmeasured characteristics. To incorporate any effects of
early unemployment on subsequent wages into our analysis, equations
representing a mechanism for determining who among the young
population experiences unemployemnt and how the duration of
unemployment is distributed among youth would have to be added to the
model. There is no general agreement on how to distribute
unemployment in a minimum wage model. See, for example, Mincer (1976)
and Grasnlich (1976). Were the other reasons for unemployment and high
job turnover experienced by youth in footnote 2 incorporated into the
model, it might be more important than it is in the current framework
to assume that general labor market experience affects later
productivity (Hall, 1982, also emphasizes turnover). We further
simplify our task by assuming that minimum wage coverage is universal.
8. Allowing these individual effects to be positively correlated over
time rather than constant would probably not greatly affect the
results, but it would complicate the model considerably because
allowance would have to be made for some individuals who undertook
training asyouthto revert to the secondary sector as adults.
9. The model is not much affected, though the algebra becomes more
tedious, if the period of training is taken to be shorter than T or
if the cost of training is presumed to be different for youth ana
adult workers.
10. This expression presumes that the individual will be eligible again
for the training subsidy at the second firm.If an individual is
eligible to receive this subsidy only once during his working life,
then St must be deleted from this expression.
11.Note that Sin equations (1) and (2) is a subsidy on the wage rate
and not on ernings, and it is available to all youths no matter what
their wage. An alternative formulation would target the subsidy on
low wage workers, e.g., as a proportion of the difference between a
target wage and a market wage (Barth, 1974). For an early analysis of
the role of wage subsidies in a somewhat different context, see Rosen
(1972).
12.Another consideration which may influence the sharing of the costs and
benefits of specific training is the business cycle (See Hashimoto,
1979). Our model does not consider the impact of cyclical variation
on the cost sharing.
13.To generate behavior where no training takes place in Jobs offering
the legal minimum wage, there must be wage interdependence or some
other institutional arrangement such a union which raises all offered
salaries in the primary sector above the minimum wage.
14.Some of the funds earmarked for a training or wage subsidy will have
the effect of bidding up the wage of inframarginal workers.The
marginal impact of employment and training programs for youth may be
increased by targeting these programs on those who would not otherwise
be hired as youths in the primary sector. The importance of targeting
23has been appreciated by Congress and is reflected in legislation,
e.g., the targeted jobs tax credit program. Nowever, there are also
dangers in targeting since if the targeting is too narrow, the
targeted group may simply replace others who are equally deserving but
who are ineligible for the subsidy. See Johnson (1982). For an
earlier analysis in the context of government training programs, see
Hamermesh (1971).
15.If the distribution of Eissuch that all adults find it
advantageous to work in the primary sector, then equation (2) below
should be replaced by the equation n
2
1.Such a change would not
greatly affect the general conclusion drawn from the model, however,
with the obvious exception that none of the policies considered would
affect adult employment in either sector.
16.According to this equation, a training subsidy is available to adults
as well as youths, If the training subsidy were available only to
youths, 5t would not appear in the equation.
17. This relationship assumes n
1
< n2' meaningthat all the
individuals hired into the pPimarysector as youths remain as adults,
and in addition some individuals are newly hired into the primary
sector as adults.It can be shown that a necessary and sufficient
condition for this result is:
( /')PY +(1—du)(C—S)/w >PY +(C—S)( 1K
s p s t p $ t12
The condition is satisfied, for instance, if v> '(i.e.,
immaturity has a greater detrimental effect in he pPimary sector) and
PY5K2 >> (C —St)K,(i.e., training costs are fairly small compared
to total adult proàuctivity). In the analysis of this paper, it will
always be assumed that the condition is satisfied. On the other hand,
for sufficiently small values of v5,all individuals in the primary
sector will be hired as youths and will continue working there as
adults, in which case the equation n 1 =n
2should replace equation
(3) in the model. For still smaller aluesof v, it is even
possible that some individuals hired and trained in the primary sector
as youths will switch to the secondary sector as adults. This would
require that equation (3) in the model be replaced by
'+ 5(1—n
s p p2
and that equation (2) be modified to reflect the fact that the
marginal youth in the primary sector will switch sectors as an adult.
18. One might expect that the firms in the secondary sector would try to
claim that some of their activity is training in order to claim the
subsidy. Similar incentives would exist for firms in the primary
sector to claim that they do more training than they in fact do. The
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